[16]
For the more clearly anyone observes the most essential truth in any given
[p. 19]
case and the more quickly and accurately he can
see and explain the reasons for it, the more understanding and wise he is generally esteemed, and
justly so. So, then, it is truth that is, as it were,
the stuff with which this virtue has to deal and on
which it employs itself.
M. Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. With An English Translation. Walter Miller. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1913.
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